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1. Introduction
Over recent years the problems of local treasury departments have increasingly become a
focus of attention and concern in several euro area countries. Among the numerous problems
affecting these departments, some of the most serious are related to high debt levels. In
the particular case of Spain, local councils have become responsible for a growing number of
powers, with a corresponding increase in the functions they perform, and resulting into higher
expenditure levels. In addition, their basic resources are often insufficient to keep pace with the
rate of growth of their expenditure needs (López-Hernández et al., 2012). These circumstances
have led to high levels of indebtedness in most local government administrations. Although
the problem of local debt is relatively modest on a national scale, due to the lower importance
of the local public sector compared to the other public administrations (central and regional),1
it has become a threat to local government solvency and moreover, may have a negative effect
on macroeconomic financial stability.
These high levels of local indebtedness are now a focus of concern for local politicians,
since it is frequently the case that the only way they can fulfill their commitments is through
borrowing. It also presents a problem for public administration managers, as they are aware
that higher levels of debt in their local administrations will lead to increased fiscal pressure.
Politicians at a national level are also concerned, since indebtedness in numerous local councils
in Spain will inevitably have an impact on the national economy.
The severity of these issues has increased remarkably since the start of the financial crisis,
which was followed by a real economic crisis that, in the case of Spain, has resulted in the burst
of the housing bubble, a deep recession, and rising unemployment, which more than doubles
the average rate in the European Union (EU). This new macroeconomic scenario has had a
remarkable impact on the public sector, leading to very high levels of deficit across all strata
of public administrations considered, i.e. central, regional or local—although the level of total
debt is still lower than that of many other EU countries.
In this new economic context, local governments have not been left unscathed, and for most
of them the financial difficulties affecting them practically since the Spanish constitution was
approved in 1978 have been exacerbated. The crisis has led to a sharp decline in municipal
revenues while, simultaneously, their costs have either stagnated or even increased, which
1The Spanish regions or comunidades autónomas (autonomous communities) correspond to level NUTS3 of the
European Union (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics), whereas municipalities correspond to level LAU2
(Local Administrative Units).
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impels local governments to find new tools for dealing with the new financial scenario (Brusca
Alijalde et al., 2012). Therefore, it seems reasonable to design policies which take into account
the major sources of debt for Spanish municipalities.
Due to the importance of the topic, several contributions have been analyzed the factors
influencing past levels of local government debt, some examples of which include Inman and
Fitts (1990), or Kiewiet and Szakaty (1996a). These and related studies have dealt with the
general issue of monitoring local government debt. Related to this literature, other relevant
contributions have dealt with more specific questions such as the need to guarantee a balanced
budget in the long run (Poterba, 1997), to preserve the principle of intergenerational equity
when issuing debt (Musgrave, 1989), or to minimize the use of debt as a political instrument
to prevent a disproportionate rise of taxes in constituencies (Cabasés et al., 2007).
As indicated by Cropf and Wendel (1998), municipal debt policy is influenced by a num-
ber of economic, political, and social forces. Some of these forces can be controlled by local
governments, but others lie beyond their influence. However, due to the increasing impor-
tance of debt for growth in many cities around the world, and also due to the general increase
in indebtedness (which clashes with the austerity policies being implemented in many Euro-
pean countries), it is important to understand which factors are having a stronger effect on
municipal debt patterns, and their likely impact on city policies.
The literature exploring the determinants of municipal debt is not especially large, al-
though some of the contributions are relevant. Cross-country studies are virtually nonexistent,
which introduces certain difficulties when reviewing the international literature. Some previ-
ous studies focusing on specific countries include, apart from the cited paper by Cropf and
Wendel (1998) who focus on the UK case, others such as Ashworth et al. (2005) and Bastiaens
et al. (2001), who analyze Flemish municipalities, or Baber and Gore (2008) and Bridges (2005),
who focus on US local governments, among others.
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether certain economic, political or social factors
influence levels of debt in Spanish local government administrations. In this particular case,
Guillamón et al. (2011b) provide a recent summary of the literature focusing on different
aspects of municipal debt. Our specific analysis aims to reveal the extent to which the use
of debt stems from factors that can be controlled, and over which managers can have an
influence, or otherwise. In this general context, the existent literature finds some relevant
variables explaining the level of municipal debt. Some of the variables have an influence and
some do not, as we will see in the empirical section of the article. We then go more deeply
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into the discussion, indicating that the greatest weakness in previous literature is that it tries
to find significant relationships at the average level, but ignores the fact that some variables
can have a different impact depending on the level of debt of the unit under analysis. For
instance, when relating the level of municipal debt to fiscal capacity, for local governments
with a reduced level of debt we can expect that the greater the fiscal capacity (i.e. the more
revenues coming from the respective municipal resources), the lower the need to raise funds
from external borrowing. On the opposite side, local governments having high fiscal capacity
can make major investments because they may find easier to raise money by increasing their
level of debt beyond the reasonable limits for municipalities presenting a poor fiscal capacity.
Summing up, in contrast to the existent literature, in this article we will determine whether or
not the variables explaining the level of municipal debt can be controlled by managers. These
results can be helpful when designing strategic plans to reduce the level of debt because the
first decisions to be made should concern to variables that have a significant impact and, in
one way or another, are easily influenced by public managers. As a second implication, we
will explore to what extent the existent heterogeneity among local governments can imply the
emergence of different variables—and even different impacts—for municipalities presenting
different levels of debt (to our knowledge, this aspect has not been explored in the literature
to date). Obviously, the combination of the two dimensions (degree of controllability and level
of debts) influence the level of severity of the problems caused by the existence of high levels
of debt in municipalities.
The paper is structured in six sections. This first section justifies and describes the study.
Section 2 briefly outlines the legal regulations governing indebtedness in Spanish local gov-
ernment administrations and the reasons why restrictions are necessary, and also presents a
brief review of the literature on local government debt in Spain. In section 3 we provide in-
formation on the variables what have the greatest influence on level of debt, and their likely
impacts, in order to discover whether managers can exert any influence on them to reduce the
local administrations’ debt level. After presenting the empirical model in section 4, the results
of the analysis are analyzed in section 5. Finally, section 6 reports the main conclusions of the
study.
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2. Legal limits to local debt in Spain
In Spain, the amount local governments can borrow is limited by a set of restrictions imposed
by central government. The legal framework regulating credit operations is established under
Law 39/1988, of 28 December, on Local Governments (“Ley 39/1988 Reguladora de las Ha-
ciendas Locales”). The original wording of this law has been modified substantially through
the Consolidated Text of the Law on Local Governments 2/2004 (“Real Decreto Legislativo”
2/2004, of March 5) and the approval of other subsequent laws. Some of the reasons for estab-
lishing debt restrictions are described below (Arnau, 1997; Monasterio Escudero, 1996). The
details of this law are carefully summarized in, for instance, Guillamón et al. (2011b).
According to Guillamón et al. (2011a), there are three main reasons for establishing restric-
tions to the levels of local debt: (i) because of concern to maintain intergenerational equity, in
an attempt to avoid a scenario in which the present generation passes on financial burdens in
the form of debts accrued in order to enjoy better services today; (ii) because of the need to
guarantee long-term financial equilibrium, to prevent local governments from falling into criti-
cal financial situations, and thus preserve financial viability; if excessive growth of debt relative
to revenues is not controlled, social welfare may be jeopardized since citizens will have to go
without a series of social services in order to continue financing investment costs; (iii) finally,
the third aspect that may lead to restrictions is the effect that sub-central debt has on monetary
markets and on the total amount of liabilities in public hands. In particular circumstances,
central government may require specific financial conducts of sub-central governments, by
restricting debt issuing, in order to implement a policy of stabilization.
Among those studies explicitly analyzing the determinants of municipal debt, one of the
earliest proposals was by Balaguer-Coll (2001), who examined the level of debt in municipali-
ties in the Comunitat Valenciana (Spain) for the 1992–1996 period. The independent variables
used in this study were total revenue, total expenditure, current expenditure, capital expendi-
ture, financial expenditure, non-financial deficit, gross savings rate, net savings rate, treasury
surplus and economic level. Of these variables, financial expenditure, capital expenditure, pop-
ulation, net savings rate and non-financial deficit were significant. Brusca and Labrador (1998)
applied a logit model to analyze municipal debt patterns in Catalonia for financial years 1993
and 1994. The independent variables they considered were number of inhabitants, total per
capita budgetary expenditure and revenue, gross savings rate, net savings rate and budgetary
surplus per inhabitant. The variables annual expenditure per inhabitant and gross savings
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were found to explain level of debt. Escudero (2002) analyzed debt in Catalan municipalities
for 1995 and 1996. The independent variables used in his study were level of decentralization,
level of tourism, number of inhabitants, per capita income, gross savings rate, proportion of
own revenues over current revenues, current consolidated per capita expenditure, and non-
financial fixed assets. His results showed that level of decentralization, level of tourism, per
capita income, population, gross savings and percentage of own revenues over current rev-
enues were all relevant explanatory variables for the level of local debt.
More recently, other studies such as those by Benito and Bastida (2004) and Benito and
Bastida (2005) have attempted to explain the level of debt by applying panel data regressions
for the 1994–2000 period, for a sample of 180 municipalities of the Comunitat Valenciana
(Spain). They used four budgetary variables as independent variables (capital expenditure,
capital income, independence index and non-financial surplus/deficit) and four dummy vari-
ables (tourism status, population, economic level and political ideology). Of these variables,
non-financial surplus/deficit, capital expenditure and capital income were significant.
Fernández Llera et al. (2004) followed an econometric panel data approach to analyze local
debt for a sample of 100 Spanish municipalities during the 1992–1999 period. The independent
variables they used were available household income, real investments, gross savings, own
fiscal capacity and expenditure commitment, together with four dummy variables, namely,
municipality size (above or below 500,000), electoral cycle (election year and year previous
to election versus other years), capital status (provincial capital or otherwise), foral2 munic-
ipalities (municipalities in the regions of the Basque country and Navarre versus all others).
Results identified real investments, gross savings, own fiscal capacity, size and electoral cycle
as explanatory variables.
The studies by Vallés et al. (2003) and Cabasés et al. (2007) specified an explanatory model
of debt for Spanish municipalities by analyzing panel data for the 1988–2000 period. They
used the following explanatory variables: real investment expenditure, legal debt limit, net
expenditure savings due to debt amortization, level of powers, tendency to debt, tax revenues
and per capita income. Their results indicated that investment, legal limits, net savings, own
tax revenues, tendency to debt and per capita income explain local debt.
As commented in the introduction, none of these works considered the possibility that the
impact of specific variables could depend on the level of debts of the local government, because
2Related to the fueros, charters dating back to the Middle Ages that historically granted certain privileges, some
of which still hold in the autonomous communities (regions) of the Basque Country and Navarre.
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all of them focussed on the observable effects regarding the average level of debts. As a result,
it may well be that a variable with a specific impact on the average could play a very different
role depending on the level of debt of the municipality under scrutiny. In order to shed light
on this issue. We will develop an empirical test to understand this situation in section 4.
3. Data and variables
As pointed out by Casetti’s (1972) expansion method, and Casetti’s followers, because stud-
ies might differ greatly in terms of their particular contexts, methods and variables chosen, it
is difficult to find a standard choice of covariates across studies that focus on the same issue.
Given the specific context we are dealing with, our choice will be partly guided by the previous
literature on the topic in Spain, since some information is simply unavailable for other coun-
tries. Specifically, when we consider other studies dealing with different aspects related to the
debt levels of municipalities in other countries, we find a myriad of proposals which present
differences in many more dimensions therefore making it difficult to choose the variables that
are expected to have an impact on the debt levels.
3.1. Sample description
The sample comprises a large set of Spanish municipalities for which budgetary information is
available for year 2008.3 It is important to note that when selecting our budgetary information,
we chose actual expenditure and revenues (net recognized assets and net recognized liabilities)
rather than budgetary data (final expenditure and revenue forecasts), despite the fact that
these budgetary implementations are not published promptly. If final forecasts had been used
instead of actual implementations, results could have been severely distorted, since forecasts
tend to underestimate expenditures and overestimate revenues. After this initial explanation,
we define a series of independent variables that may have a certain effect on the level of debt
per capita, in order to test which of these variables actually do so. Table 1 defines each one of
the independent variables in the study, whereas table 2 provides some summary statistics for
them.
As indicated in previous sections, the literature that has analyzed aspects related to the
determinants of debt levels of municipalities is heterogeneous in several respects. Given that
differences can be quite remarkable, following Cropf and Wendel (1998) we have considered
3The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance website provides information on budgetary implementations
up to and including 2008 (http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/EntidadesLocales/).
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three general types of forces that can impact on municipal debt policies, namely, financial (or
economic), political and social forces. The heterogeneity is not restricted to the covariates only,
since there is some variety as well regarding the dependent.
3.2. Fiscal/financial forces
As indicated above, it is difficult to construct categories in which to classify the different
contributions that we will be reviewing in this section. Therefore, our strategy to determine
the set of variables to include in the model, and how they will affect municipalities’ debt levels
will be to take into account the various items or, more properly “headings” (capítulos), of the
municipalities’ budgets. Considering all the possible categories, and the existing literature
both in Spain and other countries, the selected variables would be as follows.
The first of these financial covariates can be broadly defined as “capital expenditure”. We
will term it INVEST, since these expenditures are included in those headings of the municipal
budget corresponding to physical capital investments. Specifically, we will define it as total
capital expenditures (capital transfers plus acquisitions of capital goods) divided by popula-
tion. However, the variable is partially ambiguous, since there is no standard definition of what
it exactly represents—even in the Spanish case. For instance, some authors such as Benito and
Bastida (2004, 2005) define it as a ratio of real investments and capital transfers to headings
1 to 8 of net recognized liabilities (i.e. total expenditures). However, other authors such as
Vallés et al. (2003) and Cabasés et al. (2007) calculate it as the ratio of real investment to GDP,
and refer to this variable as intergenerational equity—since future generations will also benefit
from the capital investments that current generations may make. In contrast, authors such as
Escudero (2002) define it as the consolidated non-financial fixed assets per capita, and others
(Fernández Llera et al., 2004) confine the contents of this variable to real investments only. In
general (or, more exactly, on average), we can expect a positive relationship between debt and
this variable. This occurs in the particular case we are dealing with, as Spanish law4 estab-
lishes that local governments can resort to long or short term public or private credit in any
of its forms in order to finance their investment expenditure. The definition and descriptive
statistics for this variable are provided in tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The second of the selected variables is net savings, which we will refer to as NETSAV.
We can broadly describe it as the available funds municipalities can use to conduct their own
investments. It corresponds to the difference between gross savings minus amortization ex-
4LRHL, Ley Reguladora de Haciendas Locales, Law 39/1988 December 28th.
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penses. Gross savings (which can be defined, following Fernández Llera et al. (2004), as the
difference between current income minus current expenses) indicate local governments’ capac-
ity to cover financial amortization. Hence, the lower the level of gross savings, the higher will
be the need to resort to borrowing. Previous contributions using this variable, although con-
sidering a slightly different definition, are Brusca and Labrador (1998), or Cabasés et al. (2007).
The former authors consider a gross savings index in their use of the variables, whereas the
latter define it as the ratio of net savings to GDP.
In this respect, Cabasés et al. (2007) also note how local governments that have an austere
current expenditure policy, that obtain higher current income, or that plan debt amortizations
appropriately, have a greater financing capacity, and are less likely to resort to borrowing
to fund their investment expenses. Therefore, we may hypothesize a negative relationship
between the levels of debt and net savings; in other words, when an institution has positive
net savings, the need to resort to borrowing might be, cæteris paribus, lower.
Some previous contributions in the particular case of the debt levels of Spanish municipali-
ties have considered a variable that corresponds to the ratio of non-financial surplus to deficit.
We will refer to this variable as BUDGET which, in accounting terms (i.e. in terms of budget
headings) can be broadly defined as the difference between the sum of the net recognized
assets (NRA) headings 1 to 7 and the sum of net recognized liabilities (NRL) headings 1 to
7. These are also defined in Table 1 and, as indicated, the sum of NRA headings considered
would correspond to all revenues excluding capital transfers, financial assets and financial lia-
bilities, whereas the sum of NRL headings considered would exclude only financial assets and
financial liabilities. However, this variable has been defined in different ways in the literature.
For example, Balaguer-Coll (2001) calculates it as the ratio of NRL headings 1 to 7 to NRA
headings 1 to 7. Benito and Bastida (2004, 2005) calculate it in relative values, as the ratio be-
tween the sum of NRA headings 1 to 7 minus the sum of NRL headings 1 to 7 divided by the
sum of NRA headings 1 to 7. Brusca and Labrador (1998) consider total budgetary revenues
and expenditure, in other words, the difference between total budgetary revenues and total
budgetary expenditure, what they term budgetary deficit.
Although the specific definition of this variable might be subject to various interpretations,
the sign of the impact on the levels of debt are not. If non-financial expenditures are higher
than non-financial revenues, there will be a non-financial deficit and, therefore, it may be
expected that the local government will have to go further into debt in order to balance such
a deficit. Therefore, if we consider this variable as the ratio of NRA headings 1 to 7 to NRL
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headings 1 to 7, which we will refer to as BUDGET, its relation to debt should be positive,
since local governments will turn to this resource more in order to balance the non-financial
deficit.
Our model also includes a variable reflecting each municipality’s own fiscal capacity
(FISCCAP). We can define this variable as the ratio of NRA headings 1 to 3 (direct taxes,
indirect taxes, and revenues from other taxes) to NRL headings 1 to 8 (all expenditures with
the exception of financial liabilities), and it indicates the percentage of total revenues (exclud-
ing indebtedness) represented by municipalities’ own resources. Vallés et al. (2003) refer to
this variable as “fiscal responsibility”, and calculate it as the ratio of headings 1 to 3 of the
NRA to the GDP.
Vallés et al. (2003) point out that the relationship between own fiscal capacity, which we
will refer to as FISCCAP, and the level of debt is unclear since, in principle, municipalities
that have more of their own resources will be under less pressure to borrow. However, the
opposite effect may occur, as municipalities with more of their own resources will face lower
financial risks and will therefore be granted certain advantages when accessing loans.
Finally, amongst the financial variables we also include what we could refer to as “ex-
penditure commitment” (EXPCOMM), which will correspond to the sum of personnel and
financial expenditures divided by total expenditures. According to some authors such as Fer-
nández Llera et al. (2004), the quantities in the numerator are usually very rigid (they are
especially difficult to reduce), at least in the short run and, therefore, given such an inflex-
ibility, municipalities might be impelled to issue debt. Therefore, the link we might expect
between this variable and the levels of debt is positive.
3.3. Socioeconomic forces
The second set of variables we will consider can be broadly defined as socioeconomic variables.
In this case, the number of available studies from which to choose the covariates is broader, as
most of the variables included in this category have a more standard definition.
If our dependent variable were debt, without dividing it by population, one might consider
as a key determinant the size of the municipality, measured by its population. In the literature
the vast majority of authors consider that the effect of this variable on debt should be positive,
since municipalities with a higher number of inhabitants are obliged to provide more services,
as established by the Spanish law on local governments. Authors such as Benito and Bastida
(2004, 2005), Farnham (1985), or Fernández Llera et al. (2004), among many others, have put
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forward this argument.
However, Escudero (2002) considers that its effect is ambiguous and unclear, given that
economies or diseconomies of scale in investments can alter the sign, depending on how the
municipality’s size is classified as established in the Law on Local Treasury Departments. In
addition to this, considering size itself does not allow direct comparisons among municipalities
of different sizes. Therefore, in both models considered we will be dividing by population and,
consequently, it cannot enter the analysis as an explanatory factor.
Apart from population, some authors (Benito and Bastida, 2004, 2005) have included in
the model the level of tourism—which we refer to as TOURISM. Tourist municipalities must
face higher expenditure on tourism infrastructure and a higher demand for services than other
towns or cities and, as a result, they will need to borrow more in order to meet this additional
expenditure. The expected sign for this variable with regard to debt level should therefore be
positive. The tourism variable has been used not only by Benito and Bastida (2005) and Benito
and Bastida (2004), who introduced two dummy variables to differentiate between coastal
and inland municipalities, but also by Escudero (2002), who used the tourism index from
the “Anuario Económico de España” (Spanish Economic Yearbook) published by La Caixa
Foundation.5
Previous studies have also considered per capita income. The link with the level of mu-
nicipal debt is explained, among others, by Farnham (1985), who indicates that this variable
would be reflecting the influence of a positive income elasticity of demand for capital goods,
which would imply a positive link between this variable and debt. However, there is no total
consensus on this point, and the expected sign for this variable is partly debatable; while some
authors such as Clingermayer and Wood (1995), Farnham (1985), Kiewiet and Szakaty (1996b)
or, more recently, Benito et al. (2010), consider its effect to be positive, others such as Adams
(1977) claim a negative relationship.
This variable, also provided by La Caixa Foundation via the Spanish Economic Yearbook
(“Anuario Económico de España”), is estimated on the base of available household income
figures by province provided in the INE (Spanish National Statistics Institute) Regional Ac-
counting section. In this particular Spanish case, previous studies considering this informa-
tion include Balaguer-Coll (2001), Benito and Bastida (2005), Benito and Bastida (2004), Cabasés
et al. (2007), Escudero (2002), Fernández Llera et al. (2004), or Vallés et al. (2003), among others,
who have used per capita income level as a possible indicator of economic level.
5See http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com.
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We will not use economic level exactly since it is no longer available but rather the level
of economic activity, which we will refer to as ACTIVITY. For year 2008 onwards, only the
variable measuring economic activity is available. This is the one we use and, in addition,
we consider that its link with a municipality’s possible debt level is stronger than when con-
sidering per capita income, as those local governments operating in environments where the
general economic activity is more intense will have to provide their constituencies with more
and, probably, more complex services, which generally imply higher costs.
The third socioeconomic factor we will be considering is the density of the municipality
(DENSITY), measured as inhabitants per square kilometer. Several recent contributions have
considered the relation of this, or related variables, with municipality debt. For instance,
according to Hortas-Rico and Solé-Ollé (2010), the urban spatial structure of many Spanish
cities, measured as urbanized land per person, not only has an environmental impact, but
also a major impact on municipal finances. Benito et al. (2010) also consider similar issues.
Specifically, they evaluate the impact of urban sprawl on municipal expenditures, finding that
the higher the population density, the lower the total expenditures and current expenditures
per capita which, in principle, would lead to lower levels of debt (negative relationship). This
finding, in the opinion of Benito et al. (2010), would favor those voices asking for “smarter”
growth in municipalities.
3.4. Political forces
Numerous studies have associated aspects of a political nature (which we will refer to as polit-
ical factors) with debt, such as political fragmentation, ideology (progressive or conservative)
or the length of time in power. Although it is a highly nuanced question, the number of
contributions in the field is remarkable, and these studies have been applied to very different
contexts.
As indicated in Bastida and Benito (2004), political theory has traditionally claimed that
left wing governments are more lax regarding governmental financial discipline. Therefore,
this type of government would advocate a bigger public sector, generally with more powers,
than right wing governments, which would ultimately become more indebted. Although a
substantial number of studies have tested and corroborated this theory (see, for instance Blais
and Nadeau, 1992; Dickson and Yu, 1997; Galli and Rossi, 2002), others have found the link
was not significant (see, for instance, Abizadeh and Gray, 1993). In contrast some studies,
albeit fewer in number, conclude that right-wing governments accumulate more debt when
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facing a higher probability of defeat; one example is Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), who examines
debt accumulation among local governments in Sweden.
Other studies have also focused on related issues such as political fragmentation, or how
long the governing parties remain in power. For example, Ashworth et al. (2005) analyze how
greater political fragmentation leads to higher levels of debt and public deficit. However, in
their study on a sample of 48 states in the USA, Clingermayer and Wood (1995) found that di-
vided government did not lead to higher volumes of debt in the long term. For instance,Bunch
(1991) found that when the same party remains in power for various years (regardless of
political ideology) they create public entities to provide loans in order to get round debt re-
strictions. Unfortunately, our database did not contain information on these variables and,
therefore, their use had to be discarded. We will refer to this variable as POLITICAL, which
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for municipalities governed by left-wing parties.
We also consider the variable FORAL, which is also a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 for those municipalities in the so-called foral regions. The regions of Navarre and the
Basque Country are classified under this special regime which essentially gives them more
independence in terms of managing transferred taxes and powers. In terms of municipalities,
the minimum services that the local governments of these regions must supply is different from
those that the rest of Spanish municipalities most provide. Therefore, one might hypothesize
that these discrepancies turn into differences in terms of levels of municipalities’ indebtedness.
The expected sign for this variable could a priori be undefined. However, some authors
such as Fernández Llera et al. (2004) consider that foral regions have created a relatively higher
number of public firms (compared to the rest of Spain). Therefore, some municipalities might
have decided to outsource some services which would lead to lower levels of municipal debt,
pointing to a negative link with this variable.
We can also consider the FORAL variable to be strongly linked to the issue of decentral-
ization. Recent contributions have explored this issue in depth, such as, for instance, Lago-
Peñas et al. (2011), or Pike et al. (2012). In the particular case of Spain, some authors such
as Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010a,b, 2012) have dealt with the specific issue of how the different
levels of powers Spanish municipalities have might impact on the efficiency with which they
provide their services. Specifically, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2012) argue that some municipalities
with lower levels of powers might go beyond the legal minimum, providing more services than
those legally required. In addition to this, some reports such as Vilalta and Mas (2006) actually
corroborate that the amount of discretionary expenditures of the municipalities in the province
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of Barcelona is very high. This rationale would point to higher levels of debt. Therefore, one
might hypothesize a negative link between the level of powers and the level of municipal debt.
The variable POWERS takes the value of 1 for municipalities with fewer powers. Therefore,
the sign one might expect is actually positive—because of how the variable is defined.
4. Methodology
4.1. OLS regressions
In order to analyze how the variables reviewed in the previous section influence levels of debt,
we will first specify a linear model, in which the dependent variable is the level of municipal
debt per inhabitant. Consistent with the contents of the previous section, this model will
consider the three groups of explanatory variables examined earlier (financial, socioeconomic
and political), whose impact on debt operates through the mechanisms described above.
Since the dependent variable is the total municipal debt per inhabitant, many of the selected
covariates will also be expressed as shares of population. Therefore, our first model can be
expressed as follows:
(DEBT/POP)i = β0 + β1 INVESTi + β2NETSAVi + β3BUDGETi + β4FISCCAPi + β5EXPCOMMi
+ β6TOURISMi + β7ACTIVITYi + β8DENSITYi
+ β9ELECTIONi + β10FORALi + β11POWERSi + ε i
(1)
Each of the lines constituting Equation (1) contains the three different types of variables con-
sidered in section 3. The first line, afar the intercept β0, contains the financial variables referred
to in subsection 3.2 (INVEST, NETSAV, BUDGET, FISCCAP and EXPCOMM), the second
line displays the socioeconomic variables described in subsection 3.3 (TOURISM, ACTIVITY
and DENSITY), and the third one includes the political variables, described in subsection 3.4
(ELECTION, FORAL and POWERS). ε i is the error term corresponding to municipality i,
with i = 1, . . . , n.
Our units of observation, i.e. municipalities, differ in many significant ways such as, for
instance, size. This is a common source of homoskedasticity, which is a strong assumption
that may not hold in applied problems such as the one we are dealing with, where the units of
observation have an important spatial component. Some relatively recent contributions such
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as, for instance, Anselin and Lozano-Gracia (2008), or Baltagi et al. (2008) are typical examples
or empirical applications that require the use of spatial heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent estimators. Therefore, Equation (1) was estimated using OLS, correcting for both
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity—an estimation we will refer to as HAC (heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation corrected).
4.2. Evaluating the determinants of local debt using regression quantiles
Quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2001, 2005) allows estimation of
the conditional quantiles of a response variable distribution (in our case, the debt of each
municipality) in a linear model that provides a much more detailed and comprehensive view
of likely causal relationships between our variables of interest. Specifically, the estimation
of models such as those presented in the previous section are relevant, but they confine the
analysis to providing information on average impacts, which in our case would be the average
impact for the average municipality. Using this instrument, the analyst will only be able to
determine whether the mean effect of a covariate on a response variable is significant or not.
These ideas may be relevant in many contexts such as, for instance, the determinants of growth,
which might differ sharply for developed or developing countries, i.e. for the tails of the
distribution of the response variable (Cunningham, 2003).
The conditional-mean framework has other shortcomings. For instance, the model assump-
tions are not always met in the real world, especially when dealing with social science data.
In this regard, meeting the homoscedasticity assumption is often problematic, and focusing
only on central tendencies can fail to uncover relevant trends in the response distribution.
In addition to this, fat-tailed distributions, very frequent in social science phenomena, lead
to a preponderance of outliers which are handled with difficulties by the conditional-mean
framework.
Quantile regression is an alternative to conditional-mean modeling, in which conditional
quantiles are modeled as functions or predictors. It is a natural extension of the linear-
regression model. The novelty is that, whereas the linear-regression framework specifies the
change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable, the quantile regression model spec-
ifies changes in the conditional quantile. Therefore, it enables the problems referred to above
to be tackled with more precision. Applications are growing in a variety of fields (see, for
instance, the survey by Buchinsky, 1998), but they are still largely outnumbered by those us-
ing linear models which focus exclusively on average behavior, although this is, of course, a
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relevant approach. Therefore, as its name suggests, quantile regression does not confine the
analysis to regression against averages (and hence it is not limited in its explanatory values)
but rather also uses information obtained from the underlying distribution of the dependent
variable.
In our case, the great advantage of quantile regression is that it enables us to consider the
entire distribution of local debt. As indicated by Coad and Hölzl (2009), quantile regression is
able to provide a more complete story of the relationship between variables—in our case, be-
tween local debt and the relevant covariates. We can therefore specifically investigate whether,
for municipalities whose debt is low (corresponding to the lower tail of the distribution, or
to the lower quantiles), the sign and significance of the determinants is the same as for other
municipalities whose debt is high (those lying in the higher tails of the distribution, and cor-
responding to the highest quantiles). Under such circumstances, we would be able to design
specific policies depending on each particular financial situation. Therefore, in the present
study we think that both low- and highly-indebted municipalities (especially the latter) are
of interest in their own right—we do not want to consider them as outliers—and quantile
regression allows us to analyze them in greater detail.
In addition to this, as indicated by Buchinsky (1998), the quantile regression estimator is
characteristically robust to outliers on the dependent variable, and it also relaxes the restric-
tive assumption that error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional
distribution and, avoiding this assumption will enable analysis of differences in the relation-
ship between the endogenous and exogenous variables at different points of the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable.
In some fields these instruments can be particularly important. For instance, they are re-
lated to the issue of parameter variability and the expansion method developed by Casetti
(1972) and his followers (Foster, 1991; Eldridge and Jones, 1991; Jones, 1992; Jones and Bullen,
1994), a modeling strategy which takes into account contextual variation of parameters and
functional forms. Casetti (1972) expanded the traditional econometric model to include a set of
equations that would relate the parameters of the regression equation to cross-sectional spatial
characteristics (Kochanowski, 1990). Although the discussion of this issue has evolved signif-
icantly and the state of the art now centers on geographically weighted regression (Fother-
ingham et al., 2002), the underlying ideas are still valid and strongly related to our research
questions. Indeed, some recent papers such as Basile and Girardi (2010) test (and reject) the
assumption of parameter homogeneity across geographic units in the particular context of risk
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sharing measurement. Likewise, quantile regression allows one to test whether the differences
in both the magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients for the different quantiles are
significant or not.
Compared with the basic ordinary-least-squares model specified in equation (1), the re-
gression quantiles we use in this section specify the τth quantile of the conditional distribution
of yi given x as a linear function of the covariates. As described by Koenker and Bassett (1978),
and in much greater detail in Koenker (2005), the estimation is carried out by minimizing the
following equation:
Min
β∈Rk
∑
i∈{i:yi≥x′β}
τ|yi − x
′β|+ ∑
i∈{i:yi<x′β}
(1− τ)|yi − x
′β| (2)
where yi is the same dependent variable as in equation (1) for municipality i, x is the vector
of explanatory variables, k is the number of explanatory variables, and τ represents the vector
containing each quantile. The vector of coefficients β to be estimated will differ depending on
the particular quantile.
Using regression quantiles has certain analogies with approaches such as that of Basile and
Girardi (2010), who test the assumption of parameter homogeneity across geographic units
in measuring risk sharing. In our case, running the regressions for different quantiles (τ’s) is
equivalent, since the different values of τ refer to different values of the endogenous variable
(number of bank branches), which varies between municipalities.
In the particular field of local government finances, these ideas have been barely explored,
although there are some exceptions. For instance, Benito et al. (2010) find that the impact
of population on municipal expenditures is not linear. Specifically, they find that population
yields economies of scale up to a limit, since the functions present a U-shape, as from the point
of the minimum per capita spending, if the population keeps on growing, per capita spending
rises.
5. Results
5.1. OLS regressions
Results from OLS regressions are reported in Table 3. Since they correspond to cross-sectional
data, the standard errors (in parentheses) were estimated using the White’s correction for both
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The results reported in this table are presented se-
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quentially, in three different models (A), (B) and (C), the third one (column three in Table 3)
containing the most complete one, with all regressors included. We consider this sequential-
ity in order to isolate the effect of the financial (Model (A)), socioeconomic (Model (B)) and
political (Model (C)) factors.
In the first group, not all the the variables (financial) are significant in all three models
(A), (B) and (C). For instance, all variables, with the exception of EXPCOMM, are significant
either at the 1% or 5% level, with the expected signs. However, once the model becomes more
complex (i.e. either socioeconomic or political variables are included), the impact of FISCCAP
vanishes—not only losing significance but, in addition the magnitude of the coefficient be-
comes substantially lower. Although this decreasing magnitude is also found for NETSAV,
in other cases (BUDGET) it actually increases, holding the significance. Therefore, one may
conclude that, on average, INVEST, NETSAV and BUDGET have the expected impact, and
the result is significant at the 1% level. The effect of both FISCCAP and EXPCOMM also
corroborates what one might expect according to the ideas presented in Section 3, but in these
two cases significance is entirely lost at the usual levels. However, this is an average effect
which might not be the same for different parts of the distribution of debt.
The socioeconomic variables, which are first introduced in the the second column of Ta-
ble 3, corresponding to Model (B), partly show the expected sign. This is the case of both
TOURISM and ACTIVITY, whose impact is positive, as expected, and significant at the 1%
significance level. In addition, this result holds both for Model (B) and Model (C). In contrast,
the DENSITY variable shows a negative sign, as expected, but only for Model (B), whereas
the most complete model (Model (C)) shows a positive average effect on the levels of debt;
however, none of these effects is significant at the usual levels.
Finally, the three political variables considered also display heterogeneous results. Of the
three variables, the one most frequently considered in the literature, i.e. the political color of
the governing party (POLITICAL), shows the expected sign, and it is significant at the more
demanding level (1%). This corroborates the ideas exposed in Section 3, since POLITICAL is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for municipalities governed by left-wing parties.
The variable POWERS also has the expected sign, and the effect is also significant at the
highest level. Although we had hypothesized a negative link between the level of powers and
the level of municipal debt, we must take into account that this is a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 for those municipalities with the lowest level of powers and, therefore, a positive
sign (which is precisely the result that we obtain) would corroborate our hypothesis. The
18
variable FORAL, which was assumed to be strongly linked with POWERS, takes the value
of 1 for municipalities from Navarre and the Basque Country, with different levels of powers
from the rest. However, the effect, although negative, is low and not significant—on average.
Concerning the level of controllability of the independent variables, Model (C) provides we
take the overall picture. Level of debts depends on socio-economic and political variables, both
with a positive sign and characterized as non-controllable from the short term perspective. In
these circumstances, left wing governments in municipalities with developed tourism and/or
industrial sectors, should carefully monitor the development of fiscal and financial variables,
as a way to keep debt levels under control.
5.2. Results from regression quantiles
Many of the results commented on in the previous section corroborate the results postulated
in Section 3. However, this is not the case in all instances, as the effect for all variables is not
always significant at the usual levels and, in addition, these are average results, which might
not hold for the lower and upper tails of the distribution of debt.
We report the results corresponding to the estimation of Model (2) in both Table 4 and
Figures 1, 2 and 3. For space reasons we restrict the analysis to Model (C) in Table 3, i.e. we
will only be considering the most complete specification with all regressors included.
The results offer various subtleties compared to those we obtained via OLS regressions
and are, up to a certain point, striking. Amongst the financial covariates, those which were
found to be significant throughout, and showed the expected signs were INVEST, NETSAV
and BUDGET. However, as reported in Table 4, these are average effects which hide very
disparate behaviors for the different parts of the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable (DEBT/POP). For instance, the positive, and significant (average) effect found for
INVEST is actually negative for the lowest tails of DEBT/POP, i.e. for those municipalities
with the lowest levels of debt. However, as shown by the standard errors in parentheses, the
effect is not significant for quantiles τ = .05, τ = .10 and τ = .25. In contrast, the effect is not
only positive and significant for quantiles τ ≥ .50 but, in addition, the magnitude of the effect
increases with the level of debt. In the case of NETSAV results are also much richer than the
OLS results. In this case, the average negative, and significant, effect found is negative for all
quantiles, as shown in Table 4, but the magnitude of the effect is much higher for the upper tail
of the distribution of debt. In this case, however, the effect is also significant for all considered
quantiles—with the sole exception of τ = .05. The third financial variable which was found
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to be significant throughout via OLS, i.e. BUDGET, also shows remarkable differences for the
quantile regression analysis. In this case, results are partly similar to those found for INVEST,
although in this case the lowest quantiles do not show a negative effect. In this case, the effect
is positive throughout, although significance holds only for the upper quantiles, and not for
all of them. Analogously to what we found for INVEST and NETSAV, the magnitude is also
much higher for the most indebted municipalities.
Those financial variables whose effect was not found to be significant on average, i.e.
FISCCAP and EXPCOMM, share with the rest of the financial variables the increasing mag-
nitude of the effect with the quantiles—i.e. the effect is always much stronger for the highest
quantiles. For both FISCCAP and EXPCOMM the sign of the effect changes depending on
the part of the distribution being analyzed—with a negative effect for the lower tail. In addi-
tion, some of the upper quantiles show a significant effect. Again, this behavior was completely
overlooked by OLS regressions.
These results are corroborated in Figure 1, which displays the graphical counterpart to the
results in Table 3 for the financial variables. As indicated in the figure, each sub-figure displays
the slopes corresponding to the financial variables of the estimated linear quantile regression
of Equation (2), which are plotted as functions of τ, i.e. the different quantiles, which are
represented on the horizontal axis, whereas the vertical axis represents the values of the slope
coefficients for each quantile (τ).
Interestingly, the solid horizontal red line in each sub-figure represents the OLS estimates,
and the dashed horizontal red lines represent 95% confidence bands. Comparing them with
the slopes of the estimated quantiles, it is easy to understand how misleading it can be to
confine the analysis to OLS only. For instance, in the case of INVEST, we can observe that
the variable is significant for τ > .5 (approximately), since for values below this threshold the
(gray) confidence bands contain the 0. In the case of NETSAV, significance is only lost for the
very upper and lower tails of the distribution, whereas for BUDGET we find that for τ < .3
approximately the effect is not significant—at the 5% significance level. We can also notice how
the effect varies with the quantiles. In the case of FISCCAP and EXPCOMM the confidence
bands for OLS coefficients (dashed horizontal red lines) contain the zero, indicating that, on
average, these variables are not significant, as stated earlier. However, the confidence bands for
the estimated quantiles do not contain the zero for many of the quantiles (dashed black lines
inside the gray bands), especially in the case of FISCCAP, indicating the effect of this variable
is mostly positive.
20
In the case of the socioeconomic variables, one might a priori consider that the contribu-
tion of quantile regression would be minimal since, at least in the case of TOURISM and
ACTIVITY, the effect is positive for both Model (B) and Model (C) in Table 3. However, par-
alleling the findings for the financial variables, the magnitude of the effect is much stronger
for the most indebted municipalities, whereas the impact vanishes for the lower quantiles and,
in addition, significance is partly lost—especially in the case of TOURISM, which is only sig-
nificant for τ ≥ .50. In contrast, DENSITY is never significant and, in addition, the effect
presents an erratic pattern throughout quantiles, which naturally leads to the conclusion that
this variable is not significant at all.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c provide graphical counterparts for the coefficients estimated for the
socioeconomic variables in Table 4. For both TOURISM and ACTIVITY the OLS results are
corroborated, with effects of increasing magnitude which, in the case of TOURISM, are not
significant for τ < .30. In contrast the effect of DENSITY is both low (very close to zero), not
significant, and without a clear sign.
Finally, the effect for the political variables also shows some nuances with respect to OLS.
The variable ELECTION, which takes the value of 1 for those municipalities governed by
left-wing governments, shows a positive effect throughout, corroborating what was found on
average (Table 3). This would imply that, on average, these municipalities have higher levels of
debt. However, as shown in Table 4, the effect is not significant for the highest quantiles—i.e.
the most indebted municipalities have these high levels of debt regardless of their political
stance. Again, this result would be completely hidden by OLS.
In the case of FORAL and POWERS, the nuances with respect to OLS are more marked.
Whereas the variable FORAL shows no particular pattern for OLS (the effect was low, and
not significant), for quantile regression (Table 4) the negative effect becomes positive, and
non-negligible) for the highest quantiles (τ = .90, τ = .95). However, in this case the effect
is not significant. Yet significance actually exists for some quantiles, in this case the lowest
ones (τ = .05 and τ = .25). Taking into account that FORAL is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 for the foral regions (Navarre and the Basque Country), it would indicate that those
municipalities with the lowest levels of debt are located in these regions. In the case of the
municipalities with the highest levels, the effect is not significant.
Finally, the behavior of the decentralization variable (POWERS) is partly similar to that
found for FORAL, since the sign of the effect varies with the conditional distribution of debt.
In this case, however, there are more quantiles with a positive sign, and with significant effects.
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Since POWERS takes the value of 1 for the municipalities with fewer powers, a positive effect
indicates that the municipalities with fewer powers have higher levels of debt. Results in Table
4 indicate this is actually the case for those municipalities with more debt, corresponding to
the highest quantiles, and this effect is very strong. In contrast, for those municipalities with
lower levels of debt, corresponding to the lowest quantiles, the effect is the opposite, and more
modest in magnitude.
The effects of the three political variables considered are visually corroborated in Figure 3,
which clearly shows clearly noticed how the effect of POLITICAL is present for most of the
selected quantiles, whereas in the case of FORAL it only holds for few of them. In the case of
POWERS, this effect is of the opposite sign (albeit significant) for both tails of the distribution
of debt.
The results from the OLS and quantile estimation help us to detect the asymmetric situation
of debts in Spanish local governments. On the one hand, municipalities having a low level of
debts seem to be affected by the overall economic activity, but not by the tourism activity. The
requirements concerning the level of investments do not appear to ’drive’ increased level of
debts. In other terms, the allocation of infrastructures seem to be financed without requiring
funds from financial institutions, which helps these municipalities to avoid financial pressures.
Cases with such characteristics can be taken as a ’best practice’ model on how to manage the
requirement of the external environment with an adequate structure of controllable budget
variables (as the regressors concerning net savings indicate).
Confronting the previous case, local governments having a high level of debts appear to
be influenced both by tourism and economic activities, and by operating with more powers
in a decentralized environment, which can imply the requirement to offer a mixture of more
sophisticated services to their citizens. For these municipalities, the investments increase the
level of debts because control of the budgetary variables (i.e. the level of net savings) does
not seem to reduce the requirement to raise financial debts. The obvious implication from
this is that investments should be carefully monitored for municipalities offering complex
services and maintaining important levels of economic activities once a certain level of debts is
surpassed. In other words, to find an analogy from the private sector, a kind of ’debt covenant’
should be introduced as a way to regulate the financial management of local governments. This
regulation should only affect those municipalities having a level of debts beyond a determined
point. The results of the quantile regression are extremely useful to determine the upper limit
of the debts to regulate the level of municipal investments.
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6. Concluding remarks
In Spanish public administration, all layers of government—central, regional and local—
contribute to public spending, and have varying levels of powers. Although municipalities
are clearly the level of government with the fewest less powers (the second decentralization,
from the central and regional governments to local governments actually never took place),
they are allowed to both raise local taxes and charge tariffs for the services they provide.
These and other revenues they obtain from different sources allow them to, depending on the
size of their populations, provide services such as day-care nurseries, public transport, waste
disposal, sewage, construction, management of sports centers and public green areas, etc.
The current economic and financial crisis has seriously affected (and is affecting) Euro-
pean public administrations. In the Spanish case, all layers are heavily affected. However,
there are many differences, since out of 17 regions (“comunidades autónomas”) some of them
are facing much higher deficits than others, especially those where the housing bubble was
largest—and, therefore, when it burst the effects were more devastating. In those regions, the
amount of revenues raised by regional governments has plummeted, whereas that of costs
has either remained constant or even risen. Stepping down to the local government level, one
finds a similar scenario, with the added problem that the number of municipalities is much
higher (8,112 municipalities vs. 17 regions) and, therefore, the levels of heterogeneity are also
much higher, with many municipalities facing extremely stringent financial needs, to which
the responses have differed remarkably.
Under these circumstances, this paper has analyzed the main determinants of local gov-
ernment debt in Spain. This question has been partly approached in previous contributions,
which found relevant results. However, the previous literature implicitly assumed that the
impact of the different variables was homogeneous across the 8,112 municipalities, disregarding
the possibility that effects could vary for different quantiles of the distribution of municipal
debt. In other words, most of the subtleties that might exist were hidden by the fact that results
were summarized into an average effect. We consider that this might be an over-simplification,
since based only on this summary, economic policy recommendations would not be tuned to
match the intrinsic characteristics of each municipality.
Our results indicate that for most of the variables considered to have an impact on mu-
nicipalities’ debt, which were in line with those used by previous literature, the effects vary
considerably depending on the quantile of the conditional distribution of local government
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debt. This implies that the explanations one might have previously found (explanations that
did not take into account these differing effects by quantile) should state that the impacts found
corresponded to average impacts. According to the analysis performed in this study, where we
considered three types of variables, namely, financial, socioeconomic, and political, the effects
are strong, and significant, for most of them. Interestingly, the effects differ greatly depending
on how indebted municipalities are, and in some cases the impacts were even opposite for
the lower and upper tails of the municipalities’ debt distribution—such as, for instance, the
variable reflecting devolution. In other cases, the effects were not significant for some parts of
the distribution, but for others these effects were positive and significant, and this happened
in a non-negligible, and relevant, number of instances. This is the case of, for instance, capital
expenditures, non-financial surplus (as a share of deficit), own fiscal capacity, or tourism.
These results indicate that the design of public policies that attempt to control local gov-
ernments’ costs, strongly encouraged by European Union institutions, and contemplated by
the recent update of the Stability and Growth Pact (2011), should take into account this varying
reality, which is very present in the case of Spanish local governments. Failing to do so would
lead to an design of public policies which, ultimately, could be ineffective in achieving the
objectives pursued.
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Table 1: Definition of the relevant variables
Type of variable Variable name Description Definition/Calculation
Controllable/non-
controllable
(short-
term
basis)
Dependent variable
DEBT/POP Debt level per inhabitant (Total debt)/population
Independent variables
Financial/fiscal
INVEST Capital expenditures
(capital transfers plus acquisitions of capital
goods)/population
Controllable
NETSAV
Net savings (available funds to conduct invest-
ments)
(gross savings – amortization ex-
penses)/population
Controllable/non-
controllable
BUDGET Non-financial surplus as a share of deficit
(sum of net recognized assets (NRA), head-
ings 1 to 7)/(sum of net recognized liabilities
(NRL), headings 1 to 7)
Controllable
FISCCAP
Own fiscal capacity (revenues represented by
municipalities’ own resources)
(NRA headings 1 to 3)/(Total revenues) Controllable
EXPCOMM Expenditure commitment
(personnel and financial expenditures)/(total
expenditures)
Controllable
Socioeconomic
TOURISM Level of tourism
Index based on the (local) tax on economic
activity (or Impuesto de Actividades Económicas,
IAE) with respect to tourism-oriented activi-
ties
Non-controllable
ACTIVITY Level of economic activity
((Local tax on economic activity (IAE) corre-
sponding to the municipality’s economic ac-
tivities)/(total IAE revenues for all Spanish
municipalities))×100, 000
Non-controllable
DENSITY Population density Inhabitants per km2 Non-controllable
Political
POLITICAL Color of municipality’s governing party
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities governed by left-wing parties, 0
otherwise
Non-controllable
FORAL
Foral regions (Navarre and the Basque Coun-
try)
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities in the foral regions
Non-controllable
POWERS Decentralization
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for mu-
nicipalities with less powers
Non-controllable
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the relevant variables
Type of variable Variable name
# of
observations
Mean Std. Dev. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
Dependent variable
DEBT/POP 1,381 0.2851 0.2873 0.0686 0.2134 0.4151
Financial/fiscal
INVEST 1,381 1.0355 0.1827 0.9336 1.0120 1.1090
NETSAV 1,381 87.8060 422.6137 –8.4856 51.7434 119.0209
BUDGET 1,381 1.0353 0.1827 0.9336 1.0118 1.1088
BUDGET 1,381 1.0355 0.1827 0.9336 1.0120 1.1090
FISCCAP 1,381 0.4357 0.1528 0.3212 0.4407 0.5425
EXPCOMM 1,381 0.6517 0.1268 0.5770 0.6635 0.7438
Independent variables
Socioeconomic
TOURISM 1,381 52.8704 349.2460 0.0000 2.0000 10.0000
ACTIVITY 1,381 56.4461 361.9620 2.0000 7.0000 23.0000
DENSITY 1,381 0.0246 0.0355 0.0031 0.0119 0.0310
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Table 3: Model 1, estimated using OLS (HA corrected)
Covariates
Dependent variable: DEBT/POP
(A) (B) (C)
(Intercept) −0.417∗∗ −0.458∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.178) (0.186)
Fiscal/financial
variables
INVEST 0.074∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
NETSAV −3.636∗∗∗ −2.289∗∗∗ −2.166∗∗∗
(0.456) (0.416) (0.417)
BUDGET 0.106 0.169∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.066) (0.066)
FISCCAP 0.457∗∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.085
(0.052) (0.056) (0.059)
EXPCOMM 0.040 0.036 0.020
(0.124) (0.111) (0.111)
Socioeconomic
variables
TOURISM 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
ACTIVITY 0.047∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014)
DENSITY −0.043 0.034
(0.213) (0.212)
Political variables
ELECTION 0.046∗∗∗
(0.013)
FORAL −0.004
(0.052)
POWERS 0.090
(0.058)
R2 0.149 0.278 0.292
R¯2 0.146 0.274 0.286
σ 0.266 0.245 0.243
F 48.191 66.180 43.440
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood −125.313 −11.470 1.961
Deviance 96.947 82.212 80.628
AIC 264.625 42.940 26.078
BIC 301.239 95.246 104.536
N 1, 381 1, 381 1, 381
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Table 4: Model 1, quantile regression
Covariates
Dependent variable: DEBT/POP
Quantile (τ)
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95
(Intercept) 0.146
(0.046)
0.220
(0.066)
0.123
(0.079)
−0.189
(0.086)
−1.012
(0.165)
−1.027
(0.264)
−1.243
(0.430)
Fiscal/financial
variables
INVEST −0.003
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.025
(0.009)
0.100
(0.010)
0.126
(0.029)
0.150
(0.045)
NETSAV −0.104
(0.103)
−0.495
(0.185)
−1.016
(0.244)
−2.037
(0.272)
−1.981
(0.508)
−2.961
(0.793)
−3.159
(1.163)
BUDGET 0.000
(0.006)
0.013
(0.023)
0.036
(0.035)
0.118
(0.045)
0.195
(0.065)
0.205
(0.109)
0.256
(0.183)
FISCCAP −0.009
(0.007)
−0.023
(0.017)
−0.001
(0.028)
0.158
(0.042)
0.126
(0.074)
0.157
(0.098)
0.137
(0.170)
EXPCOMM −0.011
(0.007)
−0.025
(0.033)
−0.081
(0.051)
−0.116
(0.060)
0.215
(0.111)
0.164
(0.180)
0.229
(0.290)
Socioeconomic
variables
TOURISM 0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.004)
0.023
(0.006)
0.032
(0.009)
0.059
(0.013)
0.069
(0.026)
ACTIVITY 0.003
(0.002)
0.012
(0.005)
0.041
(0.007)
0.049
(0.009)
0.103
(0.016)
0.088
(0.022)
0.097
(0.036)
DENSITY 0.000
(0.007)
−0.017
(0.050)
−0.046
(0.116)
−0.091
(0.193)
0.185
(0.233)
0.136
(0.198)
−0.142
(0.867)
Political variables
ELECTION 0.005
(0.003)
0.014
(0.006)
0.020
(0.007)
0.031
(0.009)
0.045
(0.017)
0.033
(0.028)
0.139
(0.048)
FORAL −0.039
(0.016)
−0.032
(0.036)
−0.083
(0.012)
−0.006
(0.076)
−0.008
(0.037)
0.161
(0.124)
0.151
(0.503)
POWERS −0.128
(0.045)
−0.183
(0.048)
−0.091
(0.034)
0.018
(0.036)
0.201
(0.071)
0.259
(0.086)
0.304
(0.161)
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Figure 1: Regression quantiles, Model 1, financial/fiscal variables
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(e) EXPCOMM
Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model 1(C)
are plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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Figure 2: Regression quantiles, Model 1, socioeconomic variables
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Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model 1(C)
are plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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Figure 3: Regression quantiles, Model 1, political variables
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(c) POWERS
Notes: the slopes corresponding to the financial/fiscal covariates of the estimated linear quantile regression for model 1(C)
are plotted as a function of τ (i.e., the different quantiles), represented on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the
values of the slope coefficients for each quantile (τ).
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